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the Common Agricultural Policy through Time 
Adrian KAY and Robert ACKRILL 
Investigating the reasons for change and continuity is central to any historical per-
spective on the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). However, this investigation is 
often hampered by the problem of specifying the explanandum, or in social science 
language operationalising the dependent variable, 'the CAP' . What are the appro-
priate dimensions and scales at which to track the CAP through time? Policy has been 
described as a meso-level, whereas others recognise that policy also encompasses 
micro decisions.1 Peter Hall's framework of three levels of policy - paradigms, in-
struments, calibration - was the first effort to move description of policy change 
beyond a single variable and it remains the mainstay for most analyses of policy 
development.2 This enduring impact attests to the originality of Hall in moving the 
description of policy change to stress the cognitive and normative dimensions of a 
policy alongside more formal, legalistic policy instruments. As Chris Elton in this 
volume sets out, the application of the Hall scheme to the CAP has encouraged scho-
lars to be sensitive to how ideas rather than calculations of material self-interest may 
drive policy-making; and in raising questions about the relationship between ideas 
and material factors in CAP policy processes by stressing that policymakers work 
within a framework of beliefs that specifies goals and instruments, as well as the 
nature of the policy problems. 
There are criticisms about the degree of sensitivity in Hall's framework to policy 
change; in particular, whilst the notion of a policy paradigm may provide some le-
verage in understanding the policy-making consequences of rare, epochal shifts such 
as the shift from Keynesianism to monetarism in the United Kingdom as in the ori-
ginal Hall article, there are doubts about its ability to account for episodes of sub-
stantial policy change that are significant beyond the 'normal' cycle of policy-making 
but nonetheless fall short of paradigm change. There is a significant policy space 
between small change (at the instrument and programme level) and big change (at 
the paradigmatic level). 
A recent refinement of the Hall taxonomy by Michael Howlett and Benjamin 
Cashore (hereafter H&C) gives six dimensions of policy change and offers the po-
tential for a new understanding of developments in the CAP that Hall cannot account 
1. For example B. HOGWOOD, L. GUNN, Policy Analysis for the Real World, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 1984. See also H. HECLO, Modern SocialPolitics in Britain and Sweden, Yale Uni-
versity Press, New Haven CT, 1974. 
2. P.A. H A L L , Policy Paradigms, Social Learning and the State, in: Comparative Politics, 25(1993), 
pp.275-296. 
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for.3 The present paper, first, discusses the H & C framework in terms of identifying 
patterns of C A P change across time. The significance of the analytical problem of 
specifying the C A P over time is manifest in the substantial variation in accounts of 
C A P reform over the last twenty years, from those who see strong continuity in the 
C A P as reform is dominated by budget and trade interests; to those - as in Elton's 
paper in this volume - who see a new paradigm in the C A P in which environmental, 
developmental and animal welfare interests are to the fore. The main section presents 
a historical perspective on the reform of the C A P using the H & C framework, in which 
we eschew paradigm-spotting for a richer, more nuanced account of C A P reforms on 
different dimensions; and we avoid the a priori presumption that there are one-off 
paradigmatic episodes of C A P reform that fundamentally shift its trajectory. 
Specifying CAP change 
H & C argue that the orthodoxy in the social science study of policy change is the 
punctuated equilibrium pattern, where rare paradigm change punctuates long periods 
of incremental adjustments due to shocks induced by institutional change or new 
actors, ideas, beliefs which are exogenous to the policy system. They see this ortho-
doxy as a synthesis of earlier work on incrementalism and on policy paradigms.4 
However, logically prior to any tracing of policy change over time is the problem 
of defining a policy. Of Hall 's three orders, orders one and two (the choice of policy 
instruments and their settings) are endogenous to the policy subsystem and incre-
mental, but third order paradigmatic change is exogenous. Hall makes a further dis-
tinction between theoretical or ideational change in policy (third level) and concrete, 
action based and/or on-the-ground policy change which occurs at the first and second 
levels of policy change. 
H & C suggest that the popularity of Hall 's framework has limited theoretical and 
empirical progress in policy studies. They also start with the identification of three 
levels of policy: the theoretical abstract level of the composite whole e.g. trade policy; 
the programme level e.g. tariffs; and the on-the-ground level e.g. setting the appro-
priate tariff rate. In a novel step, policy ends are separated from policy means for each 
of those levels. Thus we have six dimensions on which policy might be measured and 
change identified (in order of decreasing abstraction):5 
3. M . HOWLETT, B. CASHORE, Re-Visiting the New Orthodoxy of Policy Dynamics: The Dependent 
Variable and Re-Aggregation Problems in the Study of'Policy Change, in: Canadian Political Science 
Review, 1(2007), pp.50-62. 
4. C.E. L INDBLOM, The science of muddling through, in: Public Administration Review, 1(1959), pp. 
77-88; C.E. L INDBLOM, Still muddling, not yet through, in: Public Administration Review, 
39(1979), pp.517-526. See also P.A. H A L L , op.cit. 
5. M . HOWLETT, B. CASHORE, op.cit., p.55. 
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- Policy ends: (iii) Goals, (ii) Objectives, (i) Settings. 
- Policy means: (iii) Instrument logic (general regulatory preferences/strategies), (ii) 
Mechanisms/instruments, (i) Calibration of those instruments. 
At the highest, most abstract level, ends iii, goals, refer to the broad types of idea that 
shape policy. Means iii instrument logic, meanwhile, refers to the broadest notions 
of preferences that policy implementation should reflect. At the intermediate Pro-
gramme Level, policy objectives, ends ii , identify what the policy formally should 
target, whilst means i i , mechanisms, identify the particular instruments, literally, to 
be used to those ends. Third, there are the on-the-ground measures. Ends i , settings, 
refers to the specific requirements of policy; whilst means i , calibrations, specify the 
ways in which the instruments are to be used. Level i probably leads to the most 
confusion, given that the word 'settings' in general usage addresses what H&C call 
calibration, whilst Hall's use of the term conflates H&C's notions of settings and 
calibration. Another possible confusion is ends ii , objectives, given this term is also 
used to describe the statements in the Treaty of Rome which set out the 'objectives' 
of the CAP. In the present paper, all terms are used in the H&C sense. 
The strength of the work of H&C is to point the field of policy studies beyond the 
strict dualism that has provoked most criticisms of Hall: that policy change is either 
incremental or big bang, paradigmatic, with nothing in between. What H&C offer is 
a more sophisticated view of the different constituent elements of policy or combi-
nations of the constituent elements, and in doing so they reveal potential and actual 
patterns of policy change obscured in the Hall framework. In particular, they give an 
analytical edge to the intuitive insight of many CAP scholars regarding the potential 
for incremental but cumulative change i.e. that small adjustments in the same direc-
tion can profoundly shift policy over time in the absence of large exogenous shocks. 
Despite the advance made by H&C, we are still left with the question: what is the 
relationship between different policy levels? There is no impeccable formal logic to 
the relationship. One response is to deny any relationship or connection between goals 
or instrument logic at the abstract level of the policy 'whole' (ends iii or means iii, 
respectively) and the actual setting of CAP instruments. Instead, each level is descri-
bed and explained separately. Following this approach, within the field of policy 
studies different descriptions, metaphors, concepts, models and theories used in ana-
lysis belong to different levels; and the requirement for scholars is to be explicit about 
the dualism or trialism implicit in their analysis. 
Whatever the appeal of this answer in terms of academic neatness, however, al-
most all CAP scholars assert a link between different levels and regard this link as at 
the crux of their subject. For example, Elton in this volume argues that change at the 
broadest level of goals and instrument logic - in his terms, and following Hall, the 
policy paradigm - is a necessary precondition for change in instruments and their 
settings. Because we construct the CAP as a dependent variable, any claim that there 
is a relationship between different policy levels involves constitutive rather than cau-
sal reasoning: scholars are looking at the structures and their levels that constitute 
policy rather than investigating the set of conditions that might cause policy and 
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policy change. Policy can be constituted internally in a form of reductionism; in an 
analogy with the natural sciences, policy has a genetic structure. This view in broad 
terms underpins methodological individualism in the social sciences. An entity has 
an internal structure which accounts for its properties. On a strict reductionist view, 
the policy whole is nothing but its internal constitutive elements. In addition, entities 
can be constituted externally as a holistic entity by reference to external structures in 
which they are embedded. On this view, policy is constituted as a whole with refe-
rence to entities such as government departments, legislatures, think tanks and so on. 
This external constitution is characteristic of the literature on the comparative political 
economy of public policy, where change is explained, for example, in terms of the 
differential effects of societal institutions, variations in national 'styles' of capitalism 
or the uneven consequences of globalisation for different welfare state types. 
What are the consequences of these two types of constitutive reasoning for the 
analysis of the CAP? Once scholars accept that the CAP is to some degree externally 
constituted they commit themselves to some form of structuralism where the structure 
of the whole in some way governs its constitutive elements. This is the case because 
without structures at the level of the whole, the properties of the whole (any regula-
rities and so on) would not exist: they would be nothing but the constituent elements 
i.e. you would have reduced the CAP to its constituents. 
In practice, we think the literature should develop the general acknowledgment 
that the CAP is a social construction and draw the implication that its analysis needs 
to be synthetic; that is, it must be simultaneously holistic and reductionist. The field 
must leave open, but central, the thorny level of explaining relationships between 
levels in the CAP. Unlike holism that stays at the top and reductionism that sticks to 
the bottom, synthetic analysis of the CAP takes a round trip from the top to the bottom 
and back. It encompasses two or more perspectives, looking at the CAP whole on its 
own level and looking at it on the levels of its constituents. To connect the different 
levels, it employs two kinds of explanations: macroexplanations and microexplana-
tions. 
Macroexplanations develop scientific concepts and theories for composite varia-
bles without mentioning their constituents. They delineate properties for the policy 
whole, represent them on dimensions, and find the causal regularities and mechanisms 
among them. Macroexplanations constitute the primary explanatory level of systems 
thinking, and they enjoy a high degree of autonomy. In these terms, it makes sense 
to say that 'agricultural policy is changing because' or 'the CAP has tended in this 
direction because' and so on. This is the level at which many debates about the role 
of ideas in the CAP over time take place. For example, it has been argued that despite 
shifts in the ideational underpinnings of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) rules 
on international agricultural trade, the CAP remains governed by a state-assisted po-
licy paradigm, in which agriculture remains an exceptional sector of the economy 
which for reasons of history, politics and culture is not the subject of standard market 
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governance.6 However, for a full understanding of the systems including their com-
position, such macroexplanations are necessary but not sufficient. For this we also 
need microexplanations that connect the properties delineated in macroexplanations 
to the properties of the constituents: microexplanation depends on macroexplanation, 
which first sets out what needs microexplanation. 
Microexplanations introduce their own concepts, theories and assumptions that 
are not found at the top level. Such extra theorising ensures the irreducibility of the 
whole into its parts. Microexplanations explain system properties without explaining 
them away, as reductionism does. They not only find the micromechanisms under-
lying macroscopic properties, but also explain, for example, how structures of abstract 
ideas at the policy system level of the CAP constrain the behaviours of individual 
constituents in making detailed, day-to-day CAP policy. They look at the whole cau-
sal structure spanning the system and constituents from all angles -upward causation, 
downward causation - to get a comprehensive grasp of the complexity of composi-
tion. In short, the appropriate approach to the composition problem is not to reduce 
the policy description framework but expand it to accommodate more perspectives, 
more postulates, and more theoretical tools to filter out irrelevant microscopic details 
and define novel emergent macroscopic properties. A multiplicity of approaches and 
models is a characteristic of all social sciences that wrestle with complex phenomena 
and should be welcomed and encouraged in the study of public policy. 
A composition problem arises for the CAP using the H&C framework: it is more 
complex than implied by the notion of a single holistic entity. There are different 
types and degrees of change and thus, at the micro level, change and stability may 
coexist. If we adopt the analytical strategy of describing the CAP at the micro or fine-
grained level in terms of constituent elements - as a complex matrix of multiple policy 
instruments rather than as a single, composite variable - then different explanatory 
strategies can be adopted. 
A first alternative line of argument to the macro/holistic approach is to view policy 
change as continual, but generally incremental and gradual. Focusing on specific 
elements rather than the policy system as a whole, we may observe changes in terms 
of instruments, but this has more frequently involved re-setting existing policy in-
struments than introducing new ones. It is generally ineffective in terms of amelio-
rating longer term, structural pressures for reform and much remains in place through 
reform episodes from previous policy regimes. Recent writings in the historical in-
stitutional school have heralded a return to an older tradition of incrementalism in 
policy processes, represented most clearly by the works of Charles E. Lindblom over 
many decades.7 Institutions are adapted to new circumstances through a process of 
6. C. DAUGBJERG, A. SWTNBANK, Ideas, Institutions and Trade: The WTO and the Curious Role 
of EUFarm Policy in Trade Liberalisation, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009. 
7. K. T H E L E N , Time and temporality in the analysis of institutional evolution and change, in: Studies 
in American Political Development, 14(2000), pp.102-109; K. THELEN, How institutions evolve, 
in: J. M A H O N E Y , D. RUESCHMEYER (eds.), Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sci-
ences, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003, pp.208-240; W. STREECK, K. T H E L E N 
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incremental adjustment rather than through periods of drastic and rapid change, 
achieved by means such as layering, conversion and drift: "The picture of institutional 
evolution that emerges from these analyses is one in which it is not so useful to draw 
a sharp line between cases of institutional stability versus change".8 
Once policy change is acknowledged as more nuanced for analytical purposes 
than this duality, we return to the problem of composition. The central thrust of both 
Hall and H&C is that policy must be understood at different levels. By combining 
microexplanations with macroexplanations, in the context of the multiple policy di-
mensions offered by H&C, we may observe a policy simultaneously exhibiting ele-
ments of both continuity and change. As we set out in the next section, change with 
the CAP comes when policy reproduction mechanisms are upset or disrupted, usually 
brought about through either the budget (endogenous shock) or trade (exogenous 
shock), although environmental concerns and food safety pressures have also had 
some, albeit limited, effect in disrupting the reproduction of CAP mechanisms. As a 
result, the question of what it is about policy that is path dependent does not admit a 
single, conclusive answer; rather it remains an open and empirical matter, to be ex-
plored in the context of particular policies, each with their own specific composition 
and structure. 
This fine-grained analysis refines what can be meant by reform. The macro per-
spective can identify a critical juncture faced by a (complex) policy, which can lead 
to individual institutions being changed, removed or introduced (Tayered-in').9 The 
CAP consists of multiple institutions, commodities and countries, so 'CAP reform' 
may involve amendments to only some of its individual institutions. A common view 
on types of change contrasts incremental policy changes and "the policy feedback 
literature rooted in historical institutionalism, [the latter viewing] change not as an 
incremental process but as a rather dramatic one".10 The fine-grained approach ad-
opted in this paper allows for a perspective on change contra Carsten Daugbjerg, that 
accommodates and explains the incremental accumulation of pressure for change, the 
upsetting of institutional reproduction and gradual adaptation of policies and insti-
tutions. 
By framing the CAP as a nexus of inter-related institutions distinguishable using 
the policy dimensions of H&C, the present analysis ultimately can deepen our un-
derstanding of the nature of the CAP reform over time, showing how stasis and change 
can co-exist in the CAP, combining microexplanations and macroexplanations and 
thus distinguishing individual institutions from the overall institutional matrix. As a 
final thought in this section, it should be noted that this analytical approach does not 
close off additional scholarly contributions. Thus one may extend a familiar saying 
(eds.), Beyond Continuity: Institutional Change in Advanced Political Economies, Oxford Univer-
sity Press, Oxford, 2005. 
8. K. THELEN, Time and temporality ..., op.cit, p.106. 
9. Synonyms can include 'policy framework', 'institutional matrix' or 'nexus of institutions'. 
10. C. DAUGBJERG, Policy Feedback and Paradigm Shift in EU Agricultural Policy: the effects of 
the MacSharry reform on future reform, in: Journal of European Public Policy, 10(2003), pp. 
421-437, p.423. 
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by noting that if macroexplanations address the wood or forest, and microexplanati-
ons examine the trees, there is still much to be added by exploring specific areas of 
undergrowth, through detailed archival analysis of the sort undertaken by several 
contributors to the Special Edition. 
Tracking the CAP Through Time 
Article 39 of the Treaty of Rome identified five objectives for the CAP. The details 
of policy - especially how to achieve the objective of ensuring a fair standard of living 
for the agricultural community - were then established over the following decade. It 
is beyond the scope of the present paper to analyse this in detail, but some aspects 
need highlighting.11 When the CAP was established, a wide range of instruments 
were adopted across commodity regimes, but the principal policy adopted was price 
support.12 Several factors help explain this. First, several countries employed price 
support previously. An analysis of this continuity is beyond the scope of the present 
paper but Carine Germond, in this issue, explores in-depth for France and Germany 
the difficult transition from national to common policies. Second, there was wides-
pread political opposition to direct payments, seen as a social handout. Third, direct 
payments would have had a much larger impact on the emergent E U budget whilst 
the prevailing farm structure, with millions of small farms, would have raised admi-
nistration costs substantially.13 
The choice of price support created a particular dynamic for CAP spending. By 
linking ('coupling') production and support levels, it stimulated production and thus 
drove up CAP spending. This increase at the aggregate level of total CAP spending 
was driven by spending on commodities for which production exceeded EU con-
sumption: that is, commodities that were in surplus. This was because the principal 
expenditures under price support were linked to the maintenance of high prices and 
thus the removal of surpluses from the internal market that could undermine them: 
the cost of intervention storage and refunds or subsidies on exports to third countries. 
Initially, the E U budget represented a positive sum game - as total spending on 
the CAP rose, every country and producers therein could receive more CAP transfers: 
the member states, individually and collectively, had no budgetary incentive to reform 
the CAP. Reform events imply that, eventually, the policy reached a critical juncture. 
Initially the principal reason was budgetary - but defined at the level of the total EU 
budget, upon which the member states, through the Treaty of Rome, had imposed a 
11. See, inter alia, E. NEVILLE-ROLFE, The Politics of Agriculture in the European Community, 
Policy Studies Institute, London, 1984; R.W. ACKRILL, The Common Agricultural Policy, Shef-
field Academic Press, for the University Association for Contemporary European Studies, Sheffield, 
2000. 
12. R.W. ACKRILL, op.cit, pp.44-45. 
13. Katja Seidel, in this volume, explores further the largely unsuccessful Community attempts to im-
prove the economic efficiency of the structure of farming in the early years of the CAP. 
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Balanced Budget Rule (BBR). Spending could not exceed a certain level, defined in 
terms of total revenues that could be collected in that year. This represented a domain 
constraint on decision-making, affecting "the permissible outcomes of solutions that 
may be allowed under any agreed-on procedures".14 It can also be thought of as a 
static constraint, a ceiling on spending that is fixed annually and can be changed only 
in accordance with pre-determined procedures. 
Introduced into the Treaty of Rome in 1970 is a distinction between Compulsory 
Expenditure (CE) and Non-Compulsory Expenditure (NCE), a procedural constraint 
affecting the rules for collective decisions.15 The key feature of this distinction for 
current purposes is that N C E levels are determined directly whereas, with C E , once 
the expenditure-generating policy instruments are in place, spending levels cannot 
then be controlled directly, but only through changes to those policy instruments 
('policy reform'). Price support created an ongoing production incentive which ge-
nerated growing surpluses and thus ever-higher C A P spending. C E , a dynamic pro-
cedural constraint was, ultimately, to conflict with a static domain constraint, the 
B B R . 
This offers one of the principal macroscopic explanations of C A P reform: re-
gardless of the level of spending on individual commodities - and of the response in 
terms of which commodities are involved in areform of C A P instruments - o f concern 
is the level of spending at the macro ' C A P ' level. What our synthetic analysis below 
does, however, is analyse also the response to such a macro pressure at the micro-
scopic level of individual components of the dependent variable. By the late 1980s, 
budget pressures had not gone away entirely but were now joined and, to a conside-
rable extent, overtaken as a point of focus by concerns over the extent to which agri-
cultural policy instruments distorted trade - again, a key macroscopic pressure, but 
which yielded reform responses at the microscopic policy level. From this time also, 
as analysed by Elton in this volume, concerns were growing about the wider policy 
impacts of agricultural support policies: on the environment, the safety of food, plant 
and animal welfare, and so on, factors also addressed in the analysis below. 
What wi l l be clear from the following discussion is that the very phrase ' C A P 
reform' is ambiguous: the C A P covers many different commodities and utilises many 
different types of policy instruments to achieve different policy goals. To aid this 
discussion, in analysing C A P reforms we shall identify macro-level reform pressures 
on 'the C A P ' , and analyse the policy responses with reference to the six elements of 
the H & C framework introduced earlier: ends i i i (goals), ends i i (objectives), ends i 
(settings), means i i i (instrument logic), means i i (mechanisms or instruments), and 
means i (instrument calibration). Level i i i in each case is the most theoretical abstract 
level of the composite whole; level i on-the-ground. 
14. J .M. B U C H A N A N , R A . MUSGRAVE, Public Finance and Public Choice: Two Contrasting Vi-
sions of the State, MIT Press, Cambridge M A , 1999, p.118. 
15. Ibid. 
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CAP Reform - Changing Policy Means or Ends? 
For many years, not only did price support dominate CAP policy instruments, but 
there was an annual process of fixing support prices for the coming year. This process 
represented an annual means i re-calibration of key policy instruments, but not in a 
way that constituted policy reform. Early attempts at reform, therefore, involved not 
only means i recalibration of support price levels but also, as a minimum, means ii 
changes whereby instruments were introduced that affected prices in a different way. 
Moreover, reforms prior to 1984 and the breaching of the BBR were still being ne-
gotiated in an environment of a positive-sum budget game. There was a trade-off 
between price cuts to try to limit the production incentives which were driving spen-
ding upwards, but which would also undermine the principal policy goal (ends iii) of 
supporting farmers' incomes. In practice the former lost out and the means i changes 
that were agreed were minimal in extent. The first two CAP reform episodes con-
sidered here, the dairy co-responsibility levy (CRL) introduced in 1977 and Guarantee 
Thresholds agreed in 1982, both conform to this characterisation of new means ii 
instruments introduced to effect means i price changes in some pre-determined 
way.16 
The principle underpinning the co-responsibility levy was that producers should 
share the financial burden of dealing with the surpluses they were producing. The 
resulting levy on producers, set as a small (no more than 3 %) share of support prices, 
represented an implicit but de facto downwards re-calibration of support prices. Sub-
sequently, however, it was shown that there was an offsetting increase in support 
prices agreed in the annual rounds of price-fixing, despite the small impact overall 
of the CRL (EU prices were routinely 40-60 % above world price levels).17 Producers 
were thus unaffected by the net means i changes - but consumers were worse off 
because the rise in prices increased still further the production incentives to producers 
in the sector, dairy, that was already the most expensive for the E U budget. Note that 
the CRL introduced into the cereals sector in 1986 shared all key features with the 
dairy CRL other than it was not preceded by agreement of a 'normal' price rise. Even 
so, the magnitude of re-calibration (means i) remained modest. 
Whilst the dairy sector had been in surplus since the 1960s, in the late 1970s it 
was joined by other key sectors, notably beef and cereals (that were also, not coin-
cidentally, underpinned by price support). High world commodity prices at the turn 
of the decade reduced the unit export refunds payable on the rising volume of subsi-
dised exports sufficient to see a brief dip in CAP spending; but very soon rising 
spending in several sectors combined to threaten the BBR, as higher CAP outlays 
drove up total E U spending. The first multi-commodity reform attempt, agreed in 
1982 before the BBR was breached, introduced another new means ii policy instru-
ment, Guarantee Thresholds. Not for the only time was a CAP reform misleadingly 
named. Guarantee Thresholds worked by triggering negotiations on price cuts should 
16. See R.W. ACKRILL, op.cit, p.63, for more discussion of various CAP reforms. 
17. L. HUBBARD, The Co-Responsibility Levy: A Misnomer?, in: FoodPolicy, 11(1986), pp.197-201. 
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a certain production level be exceeded. That said, even production above the Thres-
hold received full support, whilst the price cut was introduced only after a 'normal' 
price rise had been agreed through the annual price-fixing. As with the dairy 
CRL before it, therefore, the net re-calibration of policy instruments was minimal 
and, in some cases, support prices still rose. 
Although the 1977 and 1982 reforms saw a change at the level of means ii , their 
design and implementation were consistent with the extant means iii of price support; 
nor were any policy ends altered. Does this mean, therefore, that for a CAP reform 
to change means iii and/or policy ends, a macroscopic pressure is needed? The first 
time this is seen is in 1984, when production quotas were imposed on dairy far-
mers.18 Quotas operated via instruments layered-in as a means ii change that were, 
in their basic design, very similar to Guarantee Thresholds. The key difference was 
that with dairy quotas, if production exceeded a specified level the penalty would be 
a 'superlevy' that, depending on the exact instruments a member state could adopt, 
would be either 75 % or 100 % of the support price. This imposed a limit on the level 
of production eligible for support, the first time CAP support for any commodity 
ceased to be 'open-ended'. As such, this was the first reform when a policy end was 
changed: specifically a policy setting (ends i). 
Why, though, was this reform of the dairy sector, which drew on very similar 
means ii instruments, implemented in a way so fundamentally different to the 1982 
reform? Moreover, since the dairy sector had been in surplus since the 1960s and was 
by far the most expensive element of the E U budget as a result, why was it reformed 
only in 1984? The answer lies with the situation of the E U budget overall: it was in 
1984 that the BBR was breached.19 This macro pressure affected the CAP directly, 
because it was CAP spending that pushed total E U spending up to and through the 
revenue ceiling. The (microscopic) focus in the reform on the dairy sector is explained 
by the fact that by the early-mid 1980s, it took one-third of total CAP spending and 
one-quarter of the entire E U budget. As a result the macro-level problems caused by 
CAP spending were, at this stage, both caused by and could be addressed through 
reform of instruments in this single sector. 
The macroscopic perspective also enables other changes to the institutions of the 
E U budget to be identified that, because agricultural and budgetary institutions oc-
cupy common space, affected the CAP. In response to the budget crisis, a new bud-
getary objective of Budgetary Discipline sought to contain E U spending. Part of this, 
the Agricultural Guideline, addressed aggregate CAP spending. The Guideline set a 
limit on the rate of increase of E U budget revenues, so that CAP spending should 
cease to grow as a share of total E U spending. This therefore represented a new ends 
18. For a detailed analysis see, notably, M . PETIT, M . DE BENEDICTIS, D. BRITTON, M . DE 
GROOT, W. HENRICHSMEYER, F. LECHI, Agricultural Policy Formation in the European 
Community: The Birth of Milk Quotas and CAP Reform (Developments in Agricultural Economics 
4), Elsevier, Amsterdam, 1987. Note that Guarantee Thresholds were extended in 1984, to cover 
durum wheat, dried grapes and sunflower seed. 
19. Strictly speaking the BBR was breached in 1983. Problems were put off until 1984, however, by 
carrying over the unfunded portion of E U spending to 1984. 
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ii objective for the CAP. The problem was that it was not accompanied by any new 
instruments (means ii) to enforce it. 
1984 saw the dairy sector reformed, with changes to policy ends addressing the 
perpetual growth in spending. A lack of change in the policy ends of other commo-
dities, however, meant that spending on, in particular, cereals and beef, continued to 
grow, driving overall CAP spending upwards (between 1980 and 1990 nominal CAP 
spending roughly doubled, during which time the share going to the dairy regime 
roughly halved, to about 20 %). A decision in 1986 to increase the budget revenues 
available, via the VAT-based own resource, meant that when a package of reform 
measures to both the CAP ('stabilisers') and budget was negotiated in 1988, the 
(macroscopic) budget pressure on the CAP was no longer binding. 
The multi-commodity 'stabiliser' CAP reform was, at the level of policy means, 
similar to the Guarantee Thresholds of 1982, with a cut in support prices of up to 
3 % triggered by production exceeding a certain level - the 'Maximum Guaranteed 
Quantity'. That said - and reflecting the difference between the 1986 cereals 
CRL and the 1977 dairy described earlier - the stabiliser reform did not start with 
a 'normal' price rise (a parallel which, of itself, reflects a shift in means iii). Moreover, 
the price cut would not be negotiated but would be automatic if production exceeded 
a certain level; also a change in means iii, as the new instrument logic this represented 
reflected changed regulatory preferences. On the other hand, just as the notion of a 
Guarantee Threshold was a misnomer, so too was 'Maximum Guarantee Quantity': 
as with the earlier case, all production was supported in full. As a result of this, ends 
i remained unchanged. Furthermore, even though the automatic price cut and the 
CRL were additive, resulting in a price cut of up to 4.5 %, the net effect was still 
marginal in relation to the prevailing world-EU price gap (the changes at means i 
level, the recalibration of support price levels, remained modest).20 
It is worth noting that the original Stabilisers proposal had a trigger based directly 
on spending, rather than indirectly via production, but this proved unacceptable po-
litically. Even though, since 1984, the E U budget represented a zero-sum game, 
spending could still rise in absolute terms. The implicit ceiling on spending embedded 
in this proposal would have represented a change to policy ends i , that the member 
states were not ready to make. That said, as part of Commission President Jacques 
Delors' vision for a restructuring of E U spending, changes were made to the wider 
institutions of the E U budget. Of direct relevance for the CAP, the Agricultural Gui-
deline was strengthened in that the growth rate of CAP spending should be contained 
to 74 % of the growth rate of available resources, but again this overlapping budgetary 
end was not matched by new effective policy means of delivery.21 
20. For more on stabilisers see W. M O Y E R , T.E. JOSLING, Agricultural Policy Reform: Politics and 
Process in the EC and USA, Harvester Wheatsheaf, Hemel Hempstead, 1990. 
21. The budget changes are analysed in R.W. ACKRILL, A . K A Y , HistoricalInstitutionalistPerspec-
tiveson the Development of the EU Budget System, in: Journal ofEuropeanPublic Policy, 13(2006), 
pp.113-133. 
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The 1992 CAP Reform 
The combination of reformed budgetary institutions, but CAP changes that introduced 
new ends without matching means would, by 1992, see 'macro' budget pressures 
once again affecting the CAP as the BBR was once again threatened. By 1992, howe-
ver, a second macro factor (this time exogenous to the EU) was putting pressure on 
the CAP - the trade talks in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 
Uruguay Round.22 The foregoing discussion raises a crucial question - what micro-
scopic reforms could put the CAP as a whole on a new trajectory, ensuring consistency 
between CAP and budget institutions and between the CAP and trade concerns? Se-
veral authors argue the 1992 reform reflects principally either budget or trade fac-
tors.23 The present paper, however, argues it was a confluence of the two - although, 
as in 1984, the resulting reform focused only on some commodities. In identifying 
these reform pressures, other factors are not denied. Growing concerns over food 
safety, animal welfare and the environment all helped shape policy, but the demands 
of budgetary and trade factors defined the limits of feasible policy responses. The 
factors identified by Elton in this volume as emerging in the CAP in the late 1980s 
were, we would therefore argue, not as influential in 1992 as on subsequent reforms 
- as explored below. 
The combination of budget and trade pressures is significant because whilst the 
E U could leave ends iii goals largely unchanged, the GATT talks challenged policy 
ends ii , objectives. Specifically, on domestic support aggregate budgetary transfers 
could be maintained if they were channelled through mechanisms that distorted trade 
less, a change to means iii. In effect, ends iii were left unchanged, through an accep-
tance by the E U of an ends ii change. This was combined with returning budget 
pressures that once again challenged policy ends i . The GATT talks, by creating a 
shift in E U regulatory preferences towards more de-coupled support also, therefore, 
resulted in a change in means i i , as new instruments consistent with this means iii 
change were introduced. A key point to note from this is that whilst H&C identify 
six separate policy elements, this is a useful heuristic but those elements are by no 
means mutually exclusive and, in some cases, could be seen as joint elements in 
practical terms. 
The GATT talks also confronted other elements of the CAP, in particular price 
support as the most trade distorting of policies. As noted above, spending could be 
maintained in aggregate, so long as it was channelled through less trade-distorting 
instruments. As a result, the instruments of price support remained, but means i re-
calibration of a sufficient degree was undertaken to ensure spending on trade dis-
torting policy instruments fell by enough to permit a multilateral agreement on do-
mestic agricultural support. The new instruments introduced were sufficiently de-
22. For analyses of CAP-GATT linkages, see A. K A Y , The Reform of the Common Agricultural Policy: 
The Case oftheMacSharry reforms, CAB International, Wallingford, 1998; R.W. ACKRILL, op.cit. 
23. See A . SWINBANK, C. DAUGBJERG, The 2003 CAP Reform: Accommodating WTO Pressures, 
in: Comparative European Politics, 4(2006), pp.47-64. 
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coupled to ensure they were agreeable to other members of the GATT. Their cali-
bration meant, moreover, that financial transfers made through them to E U farmers 
obtained political support within the EU. Whilst the extent of re-calibration of indi-
vidual instruments was considerable, the net effect across all instruments for a par-
ticular commodity regime was much more modest.24 
The means i changes to price support instruments, moreover, were sufficient to 
ensure that the resulting reduction in export subsidisation ensured agreement on that 
element of the GATT talks. The third part of the agriculture talks in the GATT, over 
market access, in essence, required imports to rise. This, in principle, represented one 
of the few challenges to ends iii , as it questioned the principle of Community Prefe-
rence, a foundational feature of the CAP that established trade barriers protecting 
relatively inefficient EC producers from lower cost imports. That said, by reducing 
external barriers (the threshold price) by less than internal support prices, Community 
Preference was not only retained but, by this definition, increased (although the ana-
lysis of Mark Spoerer, in this volume, finds that by a range of other measures the 
protection the CAP afforded producers was starting to decline by the late 1980s). As 
a result, this ends iii Goal of the CAP may have been challenged, but ultimately was 
left intact. 
It is worth noting that the 1992 reform focused primarily on the cereals complex 
(cereals, oilseeds and livestock, especially beef), commodities supported by the most 
trade distorting policy instruments, those of price support; and which were the most 
expensive, the direct link between price support and budget outlays having been dis-
cussed earlier.25 It is also worth reiterating the macroscopic nature of the budget and 
trade pressures. Thus the extent of the means ii and means i changes to the commo-
dities of the cereals complex meant agreement could be reached in the GATT talks 
with much more modest changes to other commodities such as sugar and dairy. 
Two further features of the direct payments saw changes to the budgetary aspects 
of ends i , policy settings. The value of each unit payment was fixed; and the total 
number of payments that could be made (per hectare for arable, per animal for beef) 
were limited. Thus the total possible cost of these payments had an in-built ceiling. 
Although the introduction of the payments saw a one-off jump in budget costs for the 
commodities concerned, once phased-in the trajectory of CAP spending was much 
flatter. This provided a long-term solution to the budget concerns surrounding the 
CAP. Moreover, these features of the direct payments can also be seen as a radical 
24. See also R. ACKRILL, R.C. HINE, A.J . R A Y N E R , M . SUARDI, Member States and the Prefe-
rential Trade and Budget Effects of the 1992 CAP Reform: A Note, in: Journal of Agricultural 
Economics, 48(1997), pp.93-100. 
25. Beyond the cereals complex, price support was still used to support dairy and sugar production. In 
the former case, quotas limited production and thus exportable surpluses and budget costs. With 
sugar, production was limited by quotas, whilst a levy on producers covered the budget costs of the 
domestic policy regime. The latter regime was reformed in 2005/06, with support prices and quota 
levels cut significantly: R. ACKRILL, A. K A Y , Multiple streams in EU policy-making: the case of 
the 2005 sugar reform, in: Journal of European Public Policy, forthcoming. 
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change in means iii, instrument logic. The CE/NCE distinction still existed, but the 
in-built spending limit controlled CE endogenously. 
Thus whilst the 1992 reform did not succeed in changing ends iii , policy goals, 
the combination of endogenous and exogenous macro pressures (respectively, budget 
and trade concerns), yielded changes to ends ii and i ; and all three levels of policy 
means. That said, with the unit value of the new direct payments determined with 
direct reference to the extent of the re-calibration of support prices, those who bene-
fited most under price support continued to benefit most under the new post-1992 
payments. On this point, therefore, we would challenge the conclusion of one recent 
contribution to the literature on CAP reform and CAP policy instruments, where it is 
claimed that "the policy instrument [of price support] lost legitimacy because it was 
simply not efficacious".26 The direct payments introduced in 1992 actually cemented 
the unequal distribution of financial transfers to farmers, the reform being motivated 
by concerns unrelated to the efficacy of price support as a means of providing income 
support to farmers. Indeed, to this day the issue of farm incomes has never adequately 
been addressed.27 
Reforms since 1992 
The negotiations that resulted in the 1999 reform began with the publication, in 1997, 
of the 'Agenda 2000' programme. This included the Financial Perspective for 
2000-2006 and reforms to the regional and agricultural policies, preparing the E U for 
what would become the 2004 and 2007 enlargements. Again, budget and trade con-
cerns were present. The principal budget concern was being able to afford the CAP 
in an enlarged EU, respecting the budget limit negotiated separately within Agenda 
2000. This task was made harder by the 15 member states agreeing to keep total E U 
spending unchanged post-enlargement as a percentage of Gross National Product 
(GNP), even as the size of the possible enlargement rose from six countries to ten 
during the accession negotiations. Trade pressures arose as a result of the imminent 
resumption of trade liberalisation talks in agriculture, under what would become the 
WTO Doha Round. These would challenge not only the remaining price support but 
also any support that was not fully de-coupled - including the direct payments agreed 
in 1992. 
The 1999 CAP reform reached by the European Council at the end of March 1999, 
addressed two distinct elements. The first continued the changes begun in 1992, with 
further cuts in support prices and (partly) offsetting increases in direct payments. In 
this element of the reform, therefore, no new instruments were introduced but existing 
26. W. GRANT, Policy Instruments in the Common Agricultural Policy, in: West European Politics, 
33(2010), pp.22-38. 
27. B. HILL, Some Economics of Public Statistics, in: Journal of Agricultural Economics, 59(2008), 
pp.387-420. 
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instruments were recalibrated (means i). At the aggregate level of total CAP spending, 
however, this represented a further shift in CAP spending from coupled to de-coupled 
support instruments, from price support to direct payments. This reinforced the ends 
ii and means iii changes introduced in 1992. 
The original reform agreement, reached by the Council of Agriculture Ministers 
in mid-March, saw a deeper price cut and larger compensating rise in direct payments. 
When the European Council met two weeks later, however, they altered the extent of 
the means i recalibrations, by reducing both the depth of the price and the rise in direct 
payments, in order to reduce the overall cost of the reform to the EU Budget and 
ensure it respected the overall budget limit determined by the European Council a 
month earlier.28 In this case, therefore, the macro budget pressure, working through 
the ends ii policy of Budgetary Discipline, acted to limit the means i recalibration of 
CAP support instruments. This can also be seen as an ends i change, as means i 
changes were made to respect a new desired level of budget spending at the macro 
level of the CAP. 
The second element of the CAP reform brought together several existing and new 
non-income support measures under the heading "rural development", also known as 
Pillar II of the CAP (Pillar I being income support). These measures covered a wide 
range of policy issues, including agri-environmental concerns and elements directed 
at the wider rural economy rather than the agricultural sector per se. As such, this 
reform represented a change to ends iii, not by changing what was there already but 
by layering-in new goals for the CAP. This also manifested itself through the intro-
duction of specific new ends ii objectives and means ii instruments, notably with 
several rural development instruments being more fully decoupled than the Pillar I 
payments at the time. Furthermore, elements of rural development, plus 'cross-com-
pliance' conditions for the receipt of direct payments, brought environmental con-
cerns more directly and explicitly into the CAP. The introduction of the rural deve-
lopment policy measures also brought about a means iii change to instrument logic: 
for the first time CAP measures were not 100 % funded from the EU budget but were 
co-funded by the member states. A further means ii change was brought about 
through 'modulation', whereby member states could choose to take some of the mo-
ney allocated to direct payments and recycle it into additional rural development 
funding - and option that would manifest itself through further instrument re-cali-
brations. 
Thus the first part of the 1999 reform developed the higher level (ends ii and means 
iii) changes of 1992, but itself only involved means i changes. Indeed, it is a paradox 
of the 1999 reform that the macro budget pressure limited the extent of the instrument 
recalibration. The second part of the CAP reform package, however, saw much more 
profound changes, even seeing new ends iii goals layered into the policy mix. The 
1999 reform also reveals a weakness with the H&C classification. The changes made 
in the second part of the CAP reform changed even ends iii, yet most money continued 
to be channelled to farmers, through Pillar I instruments largely unchanged from 1992 
28. See R.W. ACKRILL, op.cit, pp.116-127 for a detailed analysis of this sequence of events. 
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other than through some re-calibration. Thus questions remain over how or even if 
the different elements of the H&C framework can be valued and ranked in assessing 
the extent of a reform overall. 
It is with this in mind that we turn to the next multi-commodity reform of the CAP. 
The 1999 agreement required a 'mid-term' policy review in 2002. With WTO talks 
focusing attention on the remaining trade distortion within the CAP, Commissioner 
Franz Fischler assembled a reform package, agreed in 2003, that addressed at least 
some trade concerns. Most CAP institutions were left unaltered, but two changes of 
note were made. First the reform introduced a cross-commodity Single Farm Payment 
(SFP) to replace existing direct payments, primarily those within the cereals complex. 
Payments would be based on past transfers with no specific requirements concerning 
current production. The intention was to de-couple payments sufficiently to assure 
protection from future cuts in coupled support agreed through the WTO talks, alt-
hough the final agreement did permit member states to retain some post-1992 pay-
ments.29 This element of the 2003 reform is thus unique in CAP history, as it involved 
a change to means ii that was not accompanied by a means i re-calibration (although 
the changes to modulation, discussed below, did re-calibrate support instruments). 
This feature of the 2003 reform does not, of itself, represent an ends i change, but is 
strong confirmation of the ends i change made in 1999 (which was, in turn, a rein-
forcement of the ends i change made in 1992). The remaining institutions of price 
support were left untouched, although the subsequent sugar reform of February 2006 
included a 36 % price cut. 
The 2003 reform also enhanced the environmental institutions of the policy. Eli-
gibility for the SFP requires compliance with several environmental conditions, 
whilst modulation of SFP monies into rural development is now compulsory and the 
ceiling on transfers raised - a combination of adapting means ii and a change in means 
i. Whilst the institutions associated with post-1992 direct payments were not removed 
from the CAP matrix, most budget transfers would now be channelled through the 
new institutions of the SFP. This layering-in of new support instruments means, 
however, four sets of income-support institutions exist alongside each other (price 
support, post-1992 direct payments, post-2003 Single Farm Payments; and Rural 
Development), with each in turn receiving greater shares of CAP spending as they 
are introduced to supersede more problematic institutions.30 The shift to fully de-
coupled direct payments is a further change in ends ii . Decoupling also changes means 
iii because of a change, indeed a reversal, in instrument logic: instead of making 
transfers to farmers based on what they produce, a transfer is now made in the form 
of the SFP, with farmers free to choose what they will do. 
The latest reform - the Health Check - continues to nudge the CAP in a certain 
direction, reinforcing earlier reforms. Many of the key elements, though (for example 
29. See also A . SWINBANK, C. DAUGBJERG, The 2003 CAP Reform ..., op.cit. 
30. The figure is five if Single Area Payments are counted separately. These are a variation on SFPs 
required initially for the new member states, who had not been in receipt of the previous direct 
payments which provided the base level of transfers to determine SFPs. 
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the removal of the set aside obligation and introduction of other measures to preserve 
wildlife benefits; a simplification of the environmental cross-compliance rules for 
receipt of direct payments; a tightening of the exemption rules for incorporating 
post-1992 payments into the SFP; increases in modulation rates) are, in essence, mi-
nor changes to elements of policy already present - mainly means i changes with 
limited means ii changes. Even one of the more significant changes at the commodity 
level - the abolition of dairy quotas and an increase in the SFP - represents a means 
ii change as one particular Mechanism is eliminated, with a means i re-calibration of 
an existing Mechanism, the SFP. 
Conclusion 
Historical perspectives on policy require an understanding of reasons for continuity 
and change in that policy over time. Moreover where a policy, such as the CAP, is a 
complex mix of multiple institutions and instruments, explanation may be required 
for how and why continuity and change can be observed as occurring simultaneously. 
To this end, the present paper treats the CAP not as a single holistic entity but as a 
complex policy consisting of multiple inter-connected institutions: these are the units 
of analysis in CAP reform. Furthermore, it draws upon recent theoretical develop-
ments by Howlett and Cashore, which extend the earlier work of Hall on disaggre-
gating 'policy' into different levels of analysis, distinguishing between policy ends 
and means. Whilst the (unchanging) goal of supporting farming incomes has remai-
ned untouched, we have shown in the paper reforms of two basic types. The first is 
instrument adaptation, where the prevailing instruments transferring resources to far-
mers are adjusted in response to pressures; and instrument innovation, where new 
means of supporting farm incomes are introduced or layered-in. 
Second, the sources of the critical junctures leading to reform events, the triggers, 
were identified clearly as being budget-related, trade related, or both jointly. Early 
CAP reforms were budget-oriented, created by a long-term incompatibility between 
the obligations of a balanced budget rule, imposed on the EU budget as a whole, and 
the rising CAP spending created by a combination of the foundational price support 
instruments and the 'compulsory' nature of CAP spending. More recently, pressure 
has come to bear on the CAP through international trade talks, jointly with budget 
pressures until 'CAP reform' embedded endogenous constraints on Compulsory Ex-
penditures. Although other factors shaping individual reforms are also identified, 
notably growing environmental concern within the EU, we do not find them decisive 
in inducing reform. 
With the CAP involving the transfer of financial resources to the farm sector, 
critical junctures have been induced by the budgetary scale of transfers, where the 
fiscal consequences of the status quo were so great that the CAP had to be put onto 
a new financial trajectory. New institutions were layered-in that maintained support, 
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as required by the Treaty of Rome, but which also stabilised spending, as required 
by the balanced budget rule (and also by the desire to develop spending in new policy 
areas whilst containing overall E U spending). 
Trade-related reforms, on the other hand, were not concerned with budget spen-
ding per se but, rather, the extent to which support was channelled through trade-
distorting instruments. Such reforms have not removed existing instruments from the 
CAP, but they have re-directed most financial resources towards new, more de-cou-
pled, instruments layered-in to address such concerns. Reforms motivated by, nota-
bly, environmental concerns have helped determine the detailed policy response to 
the demands of trade talks. Moreover, the progressive layering-in of new budget-
related instruments into CAP and E U budget institutional space has succeeded in 
controlling CAP spending. As a result, trade pressures are now the most likely source 
of future critical junctures. Trade-distorting institutions, albeit conduits of reduced 
financial resources to farmers, have yet to be removed from CAP institutional space. 
Table 1 summarises the findings discussed at length in this paper. This reveals 
some important features about CAP reforms. Changes to higher-level means iii (in-
strument logic) or to policy ends have only occurred when one or more reform pres-
sure was binding. The only change to policy goals (ends iii) has not involved removing 
existing elements, but layering-in new environmental concerns (an aspect of the CAP 
discussed in depth by Elton in this volume). After 1992, a number of the policy ends 
were reinforced in subsequent reforms but there appears to be a tailing-off in the 
extent to which policy ends have continued to be altered or added. Indeed, by 2009 
and the Health Check the picture of changes to means i and ii has taken the nature of 
CAP reform back to the reform episodes of the 1970s and early 1980s. Herein lies 
one of the most important insights offered by H&C: significant policy change can be 
brought about by incremental endogenous adjustments, without the need for exoge-
nous shocks (a la Hall); for the CAP in 2010 bears very little resemblance indeed to 
that of the 1970s. 
